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THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY" OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 2
By HOWARD JAY GRAHAM t
IN 1866, Roscoe Conkling was a member of the Joint Committee
which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1882, during the course
of an argument before the Supreme Court of the United States, Conkling
produced for the first time the manuscript journal of the Committee, and
by means of extensive quotations and pointed comment conveyed the
impression that he and his colleagues, in drafting the due process and
equal protection clauses, intentionally used the word "person" in order
to include corporations. A lively controversy has since been waged over
the historical foundation for Conkling's statement.
Social historians have contended that the equal protection and due
process clauses were designed to take in "the whole range of national
economy;" that John A. Bingham, the member of the Joint Committee
chiefly responsible for the phraseology of Section One, "smuggled" these
"cabalistic" clauses into a measure ostensibly drafted to protect the Negro
race. Others have been skeptical of this view, and have pointed out that
it is pyramided on three propositions: (1) that the framers had a sub-
stantive conception of due process, (2) that as early as 1866 there existed
a number of constitutional cases in which due process had been invoked
in a substantive sense.by corporations, (3) that the framers knew of
these early cases and realized the corporate potentialities of their draft,
which were not suspected by the ratifiers.
In an earlier article,' the writer demonstrated the essentially false and
misleading character of Conkling's argument insofar as it was based on
the Journal of the Joint Committee. And although it was shown that
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Bingham, as early as 1856, had employed due process of law as a sub-
stantive restraint upon the legislatures, no indication was found that
Bingham in these early usages ever employed the guarantee to protect
other than rights of "natural persons". It was therefore concluded that
the so-called "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment could
henceforth be maintained only if it were proved "that some force or
influence caused Bingham to broaden his application of the due process
clause to include corporations-either sometime prior to 1866, or while
the Fourteenth Amendment was before the Joint Committee." In this
article the writer proposes to complete the study, reviewing first the devel-
opment of corporate personality down to the Civil War, and then con-
sidering whether in the light of extant cases, the framers could have
regarded corporations within the terms of Section One.
I.
Due process of law underwent a phenomenal development in the early
and mid-fifties; it was occasionally, though as yet unsuccessfully, em-
ployed by corporations; and it was for a time reduced to a state of extreme
debility after 1857 largely as a result of its own excesses and false popu-
larity. For an understanding of these developments, it needs to be borne
in mind that as early as 1805, the University of North Carolina, a public
corporation, had in effect been held a "freeman" within the "law of the
land" clause of the State constitution;2 and in the years prior to the
Dartmouth College decision 3 the law of the land clauses of the states
generally seemed destined to become bulwarks for vested corporate rights.
4
2. Trustees v. Foy, 5 N. C. 58 (1805). The constitutional text read "no free-
man ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges,
or outlawed, or in any manner . .. deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the
laNV of the land," and Justice Locke reasoned "that this clause was intended to secure
to corporations as well as individuals the rights therein enumerated, seems clear from
the word 'liberties,' which peculiarly signifies privileges and rights which corporations
have by virtue of the instruments which incorporate them, and is certainly used in this
clause in contradistinction to the word 'liberty" which refers to the personal liberty of
the citizen." Id. at 62.
But more important than logic for understanding of this opinion is the fact that the
entire controversy was a part of the intense conflict between Jeffersonians, who were in
control of the Legislature, and Federalists entrenched in the courts. See BA'rLE, His-
TORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, I (1912) c. 2. It would be difficult other-
wise to explain why the law of the land clause was here declared a limitation "on the
legislature alone."
3. 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
4. Trustees v. Foy, 5 N. C. 58 (1805), cited supra note 2, however, was not the
first public corporation case under a State Bill of Rights; its staunch Federalist dogma
may well have been aimed, in part at least, at the majority decision, rendered the year
previously, by a Republican-controlled Virginia court in the case of Turpin v. Lockett,
6 Call 113 (1804). Here, upholding an act disestablishing the Church of England and
depriving it of certain lands, Justice Tucker had reasoned "if the legislature . . .grant
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Superseded in this respect after 1820 by the neater contract clause
formula, the law of the land nevertheless continued to be invoked in the
class of cases involving charter changes of public institutions.' Eventually,
in 1847, after due process of law had developed full-fledged substantive
appendages,' and after the contract clause had begun to suffer the limita-
tions of the Charles River Bridge decision,7 a Pennsylvania court, in the
case of Brown v. Himniel,8 laid the foundations for renewed corporate
usage. Less than two years later, in the case of White v. White,' a New
lands to a private person, in his natural capacity . . . such donation ' would be irrevo-
cable; but where the legislature had created "an artificial person, and endows that . . .
person with certain rights and privileges" such action "must be intended as having some
relation to the community at large" and therefore if subsequently the legislature deemed
the vesting act "unconstitutional, or merely impolitic and unadvised," it might amend
or repeal its own act. Id. at 156. But note in considering the early importance of the
law of the land clause in such cases, that except for the sudden death of Chief Justice
Pendleton the Turpin decision would have gone against the Legislature. See id. at 187,
"memorandum," and MoTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926) 196, n. 15.
It is well knowvn, of course, that the law of the land clause was relied on most heavily
in the Dartmouth College Case in the state court [1 N. H. 111 (1817)], and while the
argument was rejected by Justice Richardson on the fundamental grounds of the historic
meaning of the law of the land, the argument on corporate personality was nevertheless
explicitly made. See SHiRLEY, DARTMOUTH COL..G CAUSES AND THE Surazm CoURT
OF THE UNrm STATES (1879) 158-159.
5. State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. L. 389 (S. C. 1832), holding unconstitutional a statute
depriving the faculty of a medical school of the right to grant degrees. "A body . . .
corporate is not, it is true, a frcenan, . . . ; yet it is composed of freemen . . . ; and
of course the corporation can only be . . . deprived of any of its privileges in the same
way" as a natural person. Id. at 411-412; Regents of the University of Maryland v.
Williams, 9 Gill and J. 365 (Md. 1838).
See also Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 260, 270 (1829), holding that the law of the
land means a general and public law, which binds every individual equally. "Were this
otherwise, odious individuals and corporate bodies [italics added] would be governed by
one rule, and the mass of the community who makes the lavW, by another."
6. See particularly, Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N. C. 1 (1833) ; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill
140 (N. Y. 1843).
7. 11 Pet. 420 (U. S. 1837).
8. 6 Barr 86 (Pa. 1805). Voiding certain statutory chmnges in the charter of an
orphanage, the Court applied the due course of law clause of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion ["All Courts shall be open; and czvery ,nan for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by tie due course of law . . ." Art. 1,
§ 11] to protect the interests of the original trustees, and seems even to have assumed
a corporation to have been a "man" within its meaning.
Strictly construed neither this clause nor the text of the State Bill of Rights ("In all
crimnal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard . . . ; nor can he be deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land." Article I, § 9.] would have afforded protection even to corporate shareholders or
trustees, yet in practice they early came to do so. This fact suggests caution when rea-
soning from a purely textual basis as to the meaning which the due process clause had
in the minds of, say, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cumulative evidence
indicates that all such clauses were used as often in their natural rights as in their literal
sense; and that "property," not "due process" or "person," wvas the key word.
9. 5 Barb. 474 (N. Y. 1849) ; see particularly 481-484.
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York Supreme Court upheld the arguments of counsel who cited the dicta
of Taylor v. Porter0 as a basis for invalidating that section of the Married
Woman's Property Act which applied to existing rights under prior niar-
riages. And beginning in the Fifties, as a result of the expanding sphere
of legislative action and more frequent collision between vested rights
and various movements for economic and humanitarian reform,1" due
process of law was warped into play by corporate interests in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois. 2
Foremost among the corporate contenders for an expanded interpreta-
tion of due process in New York were numerous foreign insurance com-
panies. A fascinating story will some day be written of the struggles
of these corporations to escape discriminatory and retaliatory laws relating
to licenses, taxes and bonds.' 3 Far back in the Twenties and Thirties
Jacksonian legislatures had precipitated conflict by passage of measures
designed to make insurance, like banking, a protected franchise, subject
to drastic state control. Against these attempts to restrict what otherwise
was a national market in a field ideally suited to exploitation by large scale
enterprise, insurance companies had sought judicial approval for a system
of constitutional protection, which, while it was in perfect harmony with
earlier court decisions and with American "natural rights" concepts, was
10. 4 Hill 140 (N. Y. 1843).
11. The intimate connection between the early use of due process and judicial predi-
lections against such reform movements as Abolitionism, Women's Rights, and Prohibi-
tion has been noted by so conservative an historian as A. C. McLaughlin in A CoNslw-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1935) 461-462. There is need, however, for
a thorough integration of social and constitutional history in these particulars. For a
suggestive treatment of the social backgrounds of constitutional developments in New
York during the Fifties see 6 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF Nzv YORr, THE. A orF Rr-
FORM (1934) c. 8. For insight into the interrelations between the movement for state
prohibition laws and the growth of due process, see CoLvIN, POHIBmoN IN THE 1Jn11D
STATES (1926) c. 2.
12. It is possible that the first use of due process by a private corporation may have
occurred in Ohio in 1852-54, just as Bingham was making his entrance into national
politics. After years of bitter partisan warfare, Democrats had in 1851 repealed all tax
exemptions granted (chiefly by Whigs) to banks and other corporations. No argutinents
of counsel are printed in any of the test cases in 1 Ohio State Reports, but it appears
from the opinions of the Democratic judges upholding repeal of the exemptions, that
Taylor v. Porter [supra note 6] and Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams
[supra note 5] figured prominently in the arguments. 1 Ohio St. 622, 633-634 (1853).
The general character of the cases makes it seem probable that the due course of law
clause of the Ohio Constitution was heavily relied on by Henry Stanbery in his arguments
for the companies.
13. Unfortunately there is yet no adequate history of the insurance industry in the
United States, nor of two closely-allied subjects, inter-state commercial retaliation and
anti-corporate movements and legislation. See, however, HENDERSON, THiE POSITION Or
THE FOREIGN CoRPORATION IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1919) 50-63, 101-102;
Whitney, Commercial Retaliation Between the States (1885) 19 AM. L. REv. 62.
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still fundamentally at odds with the Jacksonian era's philosophy of States'
Rights and the prevailing antagonism to' corporations. The companies
argued in effect that since foreign corporations-or at least the share-
holders of foreign corporations-had long been treated as "citizens" under
the diversity of citizenship clause for purposes of suit in the Federal
courts,14 the same parties should also be treated as "citizens" under the
Comity clause.' 5 It was hoped of course that "corporations [or share-
holders] 6 of each state" might thus eventually be held entitled in all
States, to the "right to trade", the right "to acquire and possess property",
and above all, to the right "to exemption from higher taxes and other
unequal impositions", which Justice Washington had declared in Corfild
v. Coryell to be among the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States".'
However ingenious as a formula for laissez-faire, and as a means for
virtually abolishing state lines and state control over corporations, these
arguments necessarily gained little headway in Federal courts presided
over by Jacksonian judges.' From the date of their first defeat in 1837,"0
the plight of the insurance companies grew steadily more anomalous and
14. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U. S. 1809); see Louisville,
C. & C. R. R. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558 (U. S. 1844) (presumed all shareholders to be
citizens of the chartering state) ; HEXWERSON, op. cit. supra note 13 at 54-63.
15. See Warren Manufacturing Co. v. Etna Insurance Co., 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17, 205
(C. C. D. Conn. 1837) ; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 585 (U. S. 1839) ; and
particularly Webster's argument, printed more fully in 11 WIZTINs ,AD SPrECIVES OF
DANIEL WEBSTER (1903) 106, 112-115; HENDERSON, op. cit. mspra note 13, at 54-63.
16. Webster only argued that the shareholders, having gained the right to sue in
the corporate name, should be granted the right to do business in the corporate name.
But the broader proposition was of course the ultimate goal.
17. 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3, 230 (E. D. Pa. 1823). Counsel failed to note that Justice
Washington had himself qualified these broad rights by saying that they were "subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole."
18. It is interesting to note in retrospect how fundamentally at odds the corpora-
tions' strategy was with the dominant sentiments of the period-how completely States'
Rights arguments cancelled out Natural Rights arguments. In the abstract, the prin-
ciples of the Corfield dictum were dear to the heart of every American; but as applied
in behalf of corporations in the Thirties and Fifties they led to consequences abhorrent
to all but the most doctrinaire nationalists. The logic and simplicity of the formula,
together with the encouragement which the Supreme Court seemed to offer from time
to time by its wavering interpretations of the diverse citizenship clause, doubtless account
for the arguments' vitality, but it is plain today that since no Court could have declared
a corporation a "citien" under the comity clause without in practice vitiating all State
control over corporations, there was little chance for success. It is significant that for-
eign corporations eventually attained protection under clauses of the Constitution that
permitted more readily of judicial discretion, and involved no such universal and auto-
matic system of laissez faire as the insurance companies long tried to establish.
19. Warren Manufacturing Company v. Etna Insurance Company, 29 Fed. Cas. No.
17, 206 (C. C. D. Conn. 1837).
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more acute-more anomalous because as foreign corporations the com-
panies were in fact treated as "citizens" within the meaning of one clause
of the Constitution, yet were not so treated within the meaning of
another ;20 more acute because this understandable lack of consistency in
judicial construction eventually gave license to new and more alarming
forms of discrimination. Beginning in the Forties and Fifties State
legislatures not only undertook to raise the license fees and premium
taxes formerly collected, but also began experimenting with provisions
that required deposit of large cash bonds-taxable in most cases-as
security for resident policy holders. 21 Legitimate in principle, these re-
quirements naturally provoked retaliation, tied up progressively large
amounts of capital, restricted and at times demoralized the entire insur-
ance business.
22
To combat these tendencies, established companies in the Fifties turned
to the State courts, using a wide range of constitutional weapons, but
relying most heavily on the Comity clause, and on the hope of gaining
a decision which might eventually be employed to overturn Chief Justice
Taney's opinion in Bank of Augusta v. Earle.23 Failing in at least three
20. HENDERSON, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 50-76, presents the classic analysis of this
paradox.
21. See id. at 101-102; Whitney, supra note 13. Recrudescence of the ancient coni-
mercial feud between New York nd New Jersey, quiescent since the Twenties, scents
to have led to the bonding requirement, which soon spread to other States and found
most drastic and ingenious use in the Far West during the Civil War. See infIra note 63.
22. It is difficult today to disentangle the motives that led to these enactments, and
even more difficult to pass on the merits. In general one can say that like all such enter-
prises at the time, insurance companies were economically undertaxed, and real property
owners were campaigning for equalization through licenses and premium taxes. Insol-
vencies and fly-by-night agencies were cited to justify the bonding requirements. Local
promoters and ambitious capitalists stepped in, organized "wild cat mutuals" without
actuarial knowledge or distribution of risks, and appealed for stiff discriminations to
further their schemes. Old line companies thus suffered not merely the restriction of
the market, but the discredit which failure of the "wild cats" eventually brought to the
still novel principle of insurance. Caught thus between the upper and the nether stones,
conservative Eastern companies had good reason for alarm, particularly since retaliation
proved scarcely better than suicide.
23. 13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839) (corporations not citizens under comity clause). For
the companies' strategy see assembled arguments and briefs, The Fire Department v.
Noble, The Fire Department v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith 440 ff, 453 ff, particularly 458-
468, 472-486 (C. P. N. Y. 1854). For evidence of how quick the Southern agrarian
on the United States Supreme Court were to sense and spike the companies' move, see
Justice Campbell's opinion in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R. k ., 16 How. 314, 352
(U. S. 1853). Apprehension that a tendency to liberalize interpretations of corporate
citizenship under Art. III, Sec. 2, might favor the companies' strategy caused the Court
in this case virtually to repudiate the Letson dictum, note 14 .upra; cf. also Rundle v.
Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 14 How. 80 (U. S. 1852), particularly Daniels' dissent
at 95; see HENDERSON, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 60-63.
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attempts in Kentucky,2 4 Illinois2 and New Jersey,20 counsel finally selected
a test case in the New York Court of Common Pleas. Elaborate argu-
ments were made under the Comity and the just compensation clauses,2 I
though no mention appears to have been made of due process.' But before
decision could be rendered in the test case, the Court of Appeals decided
Westervelt v. Gregg,-9 which voided the Married Woman's Property Act
as a denial of due process. Encouraged by this expansion, counsel for
the insurance companies abandoned their Comity clause and just com-
pensation attack in favor of a new test suit, commenced and elaborately
argued on due process grounds."0  Yet the subsequent opinion of the
Court of Common Pleas took no notice of the insurance companies'
new argument; and it is possible that the "law of the land" might again
have undergone eclipse had it not been for passage, in April 1855, of the
New York anti-liquor law applying even to liquor on hand at the time
of passage." This law, held void, as a denial of due process to private
persons, by several judges of the State Supreme Court as early as July,2
remained a center of controversy throughout the year.m In March, 1856,
24. Commonwealth v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212 (Ky. July, 1851) (overruling a favor-
able decision in the lower court).
25. People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554 (June, 1852) (rejecting arguments that a la,:
licensing agents of foreign companies violated the Commerce clause). Immediately fol-
lowing this decision, the Illinois Legislature, currently in session, passed a statute mod-
elled on that of New York levying a tax of two per cent on all premiums collected by
the agents for outside companies, the tax going to the Chicago firemen, who at this date
of course were as fearless in politics as at fires. See note 42, infra.
26. Tatem v. Wright, 3 Zab. 429 (N. J. Law, November, 1852).
27. New York Fire Dept. v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith 440 (N. Y. November, 1854)
(validity of tax of two per cent on all fire premiums collected by outside companies
levied in support of the New York Fire Department, at that time a chartered corpora-
tion).
28. Possibly because in 1851, lawyers for individual private property owners in
Brooklyn had been unsuccessful in an attempt to employ the earlier due process dicta
of Taytor v. Porter and White v. White to contest the validity of certain special assess-
ments for street improvements. See People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Comst. 419 (N.Y.
April, 1851) [overruling decision which had invalidated the assessments as violations
of the just compensation clause, 6 Barb. 209, (1849)]. No arguments of counsel are
given in 4 Comstock but the due process point is covered obliquely in the opinion at
423 and 438.
29. 2 N. Y. 202 (1854).
30. New York Fire Dept. v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith 453 (N. Y. 1854).
31. CoLwvm, op. cit. supra note 11, c. 2.
32. People v. Toymbee, People v. Berberrich, 20 Barb. 163 (N. Y. 1855).
33. Cf. Wynehamer v. The People, 20 Barb. 567 (N. Y. Sup. CL SepL 1865) (la,
sustained). The argument of F. J. Fithian in this case. pp. 569-588, is a landmark in the
development of due process of law. It shows how far the guarantee was explored prior
to the Civil War and helps to explain the elaborate dicta in the Court of Appeals opinions
delivered six months later.
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following presentation of due process arguments by a former colleague 4
who had concurred in Westervelt v. Gregg, members of the Court of
Appeals handed down the celebrated decision in Wynehamer v. The
People.33 Alarmed at the spread of anti-slavery, anti-liquor, and Women's
Rights agitation,"0 four of the concurring judges, -by dicta reminiscent
of stump speeches, undertook to rally conservative opinion and to erect
judicial barriers for the protection of property rights.37 Naturally this
step proved a signal for further attack on the New York insurance laws
by counsel who cited the various dicta to prove that local agents for
foreign companies had been denied the right to pursue a lawful calling
in violation of due process.38 But the Court of Appeals, already subject
to bitter criticism for the Wyneharner decision, declined to intervene in
favor of the corporations.39
While there is abundant reason to believe the Court of Appeals dicta
had temporarily excited the hopes of companies' counsel, and caused the
due process clause later to be argued extensively in cases before the Court
of Appeals,4" it was nevertheless on the Comity clause that chief reliance
continued to be made. In Virginia in 1856,"' again in Illinois in 1859,
42
34. Amasa J. Parker, who later in the same year was the unsuccessful Democratic
candidate for Governor of New York.
35. 13 N. Y. 378 (1856). Strictly speaking, certain of the opinions here reported
cover the case of The People v. Toynbee; see pp. 486-488 for the manner in which the
eight Judges, six of whom concurred in voiding the law as it applied to liquor on hand,
divided on the overlapping cases.
36. See particularly the opinion of justice Comstock, alluding to "the danger" of
"theories alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights, but subversive of
the just and necessary powers of government, [which now] attract the belief of consid-
erable classes of men," and declaiming that "too much reverence for government and law
is certainly among the least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed." Id. at
391-392. Professor Corwin has regarded these words as aimed at the Abolitionists. The
Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (1911) 24 HARV. L. Rlrv. 460,
469-471. But the target seems likely to have been broader. Comstock's attitude is
the more striking because he saw plainly that judicial delimitation of legislative powers
contained "germs of great mischief to society by giving to private opinion and specula-
tion a license to oppose themselves to the just and legitimate powers of government."
37. Justice Selden included "all vested rights to [corporate?] franchises," which
otherwise might be left "entirely at the mercy of the legislature." 13 N. Y. 378, 434
(1856).
38. See the arguments of William Curtis Noyes, 3 E. D. Smith 458-468 (N. Y,
1854), who cited particularly the Wynehanier opinions of Comstock and Johnson, J. J., 13
N. Y. 378, 392-393, 416-421.
39. The opinions in 3 E. D. Smith 440, note 27 supra, are reported as "unanimously
affirmed" by the Court of Appeals. For facts bearing on failure to appeal to U. S. Supreme
Court, see note 42, infra.
40. The date of arguments and decision by the high court is unknown, but since
Noyes' revised brief makes effective use of the opinions in Wynehamer v. People, the
date was sometime after March, 1856.
41. Slaughter v. Commonvealth, 13 Grat. 767 (Va. 1856).
42. Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511 (1859) (sustaining the
tax mentioned note 25 supra). No indication here that due process was raised, although
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and in WVisconsin in the first year of the Civil WVar,40 the battle went
on, yet wholly without tangible results. The way was definitely blocked.
It was in Pennsylvania therefore, and not in New York, that the doc-
trine of corporate personality made its farthest advance. And it was a
railroad, not an insurance company, which led the charge. Following a
long struggle between the State and the Erie and North East Railroad,
many of whose acts were cited as ultra vires, the Pennsylvania legislature
in 185-5 repealed the franchises of the corporation.44 Since no provision
had been made in the repealing statute for judicial proceedings to deter-
mine the fact of franchise abuse, lawyers for the company challenged the
law both as an impairment of contract and as denial of due process.
41
The majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Jeremiah S. Black
on January 9, 1856, took no notice of the latter point. Chief Justice
Lewis however, in a dissenting opinion,4 accepted the view that these
were judicial, not legislative questions, and held that the property of the
stockholders had been taken "without the judgment of their peers, and
contrary to the lav of the land established by the constitution" 4---held
in short, that whether or not they were "men" or "the accused in criminal
prosecutions", corporations were nevertheless to be granted such protec-
tion against legislatures as the judiciary might believe compatible with
sound public policy.
the statute at issue was the one which had inspired Mark Skinner's brief printed in 3
E. D. Smith. See note 23 supra. Possibly the adverse criticism of the Dred Scott deci-
sions accounts for failure to use the argument.
43. Miluaukee Fire Dept. v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136 (1862) (due process used by
counsel at 138).
44. See 6 GREAT AmERICAN. LAWYERS (1907) 1-74; KIuNGELSM Tn, JE LMiIAH S.
BLACY, 20-25.
45. Erie and North East Railroad v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287, 293 (1856). Counsel quoted
this striking dictum from Brown v. Hummel, 6 Barr. 6, 91: "It is againsl the pr ci-
ples of liberty and common right to deprie a man of his properly or franchise while he
is within the pale of the constitution, and with his hands on the altar, and 9g'e it to
another, without hearing or trial by due course and process of law." [Italics added].
46. 1 Grant's Cases (Pa. 1856) 274.
47. Id. at 290. In the conclusion of his opinion Justice Lewis seems to have relied
on Article I, Section 9-("In all criminal prosecutions the accused") yet in the body (at
p. 276) he was intent on showing that "the stockholders" were "tangible individuals"-
i.e., "men"-within the meaning of Article I, Section 11. One concludes therefore that
the judge was quite aware the text was hardly suited to his purposes, and that even the
fiction of "looking through" to the stockholders left certain rough edges to the argument.
See note 8 supra for texts of these clauses.
Perhaps the best illustration of the Pennsylvania Courts' tendency to disregard con-
stitutional texts is found in Reiser v. William Tell Savings Fund Association, 39 Pa.
137 (1861). Justice Lowrie, in voiding a special statute which had legalized usurious
interest rates of building and loan associations, wrestled with the phraseology of Arti-
cle I, Section 9 (supra note 8), and by sheer force of will made it apply to eil as well
as criminal proceedings. The phraseology meant, he declared, paraphrasing to suit his
argument, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by the legal
1938].
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Simultaneously with these parallel (and outwardly independent) cor-
porate invocations of due process of law in New York and Pennsylvania,
a third use occurred in Illinois which was clearly inspired by example.
On February 23, 1856, just six weeks after the decision in Eric Railroad
v. Casey, (and while the insurance and liquor act cases wert- still pending
in the New York Courts) Mark Skinner, a former judge of the Illinois
Supreme Court now retained by insurance interests, wrote a brief4 8 argu-
ing that an Illinois insurance statute modelled on that currently challenged
in the East was invalid as a denial of due process.
4
Judge Skinner's brief is a striking symbol of developments that over-
took due process of law in the ensuing twelve months. During this period
substantive and political use of the clause broke all bounds and culminated
in a costly and tragic blunder. On March 6th-within two weeks from
the date of Judge Skinner's brief, within two months from the decision
in Erie Railroad v. Casey, and almost simultaneously with the Court of
Appeals decision in Wynehamer v. The People-Bingham delivered his
maiden speech in Congress, citing the Kansas slave code as a violation
of due process."0 On April 4th, Representative Granger of New York
spoke similarly, 1 followed on May 22 by Bingham's colleague, Repre-
sentative Bliss. 2 In June, Joshua Giddings, the veteran Ohio Abolitionist,
drafted the Kansas-due process planks which were adopted by the first
Republican National Convention at Philadelphia. 3 In the ensuing cam-
paign, "Bleeding Kansas" and "due process of law" were the twin catch
phrases of Republican orators. In November a concurring minority of
the Indiana Supreme Court assumed a corporation to be a "man" entitled
to the protection of due course of law. " In January, 1857, Bingham and
judgment of his peers, or other due course or process of law. Here, civil and criminal
law, rights of property, and of life and liberty, are put in the same class. Rights of prop-
erty (and money possessed and owned is property) and the rights of life and liberty,
have the same guarantee that they are to be tried by due course of law. But they have
not the same guarantee, if the legislature may direct the Court, after civil eases arise,
or after contracts or other transaction are complete, how we shall interpret the law under
which they arise; which it is admitted they cannot do in criminal cases. This section of
the Bill of Rights is violated when civil and criminal rights are not both alike tried by
due course of law." (Italics added).
Edgar W. Camp errs in listing this as a corporate personality case. See Corporations
and the Fourteenth Aviendment (1938) 13 STATE BAR JOURNAL (Calif.) 12, 18 n. 25.
Justice Lowrie's ingenuity was directed solely in behalf of natural persons; his decision
being in favor of Reiser, the plaintiff in error.
48. Printed in 3 E. D. Smith, 472-478 (N. Y. 1854); reprinted in a CIRCULAR TO THlE
INSURANCE AGENTS OF TIE U rr_ STATES. See note 66, infra.
49. See note 25, supra, for history of the Illinois law.
50. See First Article, (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 371, 393-395, particularly notes 73, 78.
51. Ibid., particularly n. 83.
52. Ibid.
53. Id. at n. 79, 80.
54. Madison & Indianapolis R. R. v. Whiteneck, 8 Tanner 217 (Ind. 1856).
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Bliss once again employed the clause-tis time to bolster Congress'
power over slavery in the Territories. And less than six weeks later, Chief
Justice Taney, succumbing to a year of provocation, drafted the dictum
in the case of Dred Scott"0 which hastened the Civil War and destruction
of everything his opinion had been designed to preserve.
II.
We may now consider the implications of these discoveries. Manifestly,
the foregoing facts, while in no way altering our conclusion that Bingham
was concerned primarily with protecting free Negroes and mulattoes-
that he was an idealist, in short, and an opportunist, not a schemer-
nevertheless do suggest certain important secondary considerations.
The first is that so far as due process of law is concerned, Bingham's
original use of the phrase in 1856 could easily have derived from, and
thus have been made with full knowledge of, one or more of several
earlier corporate usages. It is idle, without knowing more of Bingham's
early attitude toward corporations, to speculate on the full significance
of this discovery; yet it seems obvious that one cannot categorically reject
the thesis that Bingham in 1866 at least regarded corporations as included
along with natural persons, so long as there exists the possibility that he
first used the clause (ten years earlier) as a result of a number of uses
by corporations.
A second consideration is that the entire battery of constitutional
clauses which Bingham had by 1859 evolved for the protection of free
Negroes and mulattoes was virtually identical with the battery which
insurance company lawyers evolved in the New York courts between
1854-1856 for the protection of foreign corporations. Due process of
law, just compensation, and interstate privileges and immunities were the
components of both systems. The point in this connection is not that
Bingham's entire system was consciously based on that of the corporations
-- one can be reasonably certain that it was not.57 It is, rather, that we
are confronted with two separate lines of usage of the same set of con-
55. First Article, (1938) 47 YArE L. J. 371, at 395, n. 83, 86, 87.
56. 19 How. 393, 450 (U. S. 1856). See SwisnEn, RoGou Bn0oKE TAmsv (1936)
476-523. Relevant here is Professor Borchard's conclusion: "If the due process dcci-
sions on substantive law prove anything, they demonstrate that the Court's judgment
is the product of the will. It is the social and economic predilection which speaks:'
The Supreme Court and Prizate Rights (1938) 47 YAL. L. J. 1051, 1078.
57. If only for the reason that use of the comity clause to protect free Negroes and
mulattoes dated back to the Missouri Compromise [see GwRGE , TUE POLITICAL Hisro"
OF SLAVER IN THE UNITED STATES (1915) 38-39, 48-51]; and that virtually every con-
stitutional argument conceivable was employed by both sides in the Slavery debates.
Recognition of the ingenuity of even the amateur constitutional lawyer throughout Amer-
ican history makes unnecessary the assumption that Bingham w%-as incapable of choosing
his own weapons.
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stitutional clauses-the set that eventually finds its way into Section One.
The crucial question therefore, is not what minor cross-pollenizations
may have influenced the early development of the two systems, but what
relations existed between the two in 1866? At that time we are certain
at least that idealists intent on securing Negro rights undertook to use
constitutional phraseology and concepts which corporations had already
been using for a generation. Did the idealists proceed to do this without
awakening the interest and participation of the business group? Was the
Fourteenth Amendment a sheer windfall for Business-a product of un-
solicited aid? Or was it somehow the product of joint interest and joint
participation? Was it framed with reference to the needs of both Negroes
and corporations? Or was it simply made up of clauses which had been
utsed in behalf of both Negroes and corporations? Did Bingham, assum-
ing now that he originally had been indifferent to, if not wholly oblivious
of the use of his "system" by corporations, remain so during the months
the Amendment was before the Joint Committee ?58 Did insurance com-
rany lawyers, who had proved so quick to capitalize the dicta of Wester-
v'elt v. Gregg and Wynehamer v. The People in the State courts, and
who had fought stubbornly but without success for a decision holding
a corporation to be a "citizen" under the Comity clause, manifest no
interest when the due process-comity clause phraseology was proposed
in Section One? Did foreign corporations, suffering from what they
regarded as discriminatory taxation and "class legislation,"'r" exhibit any
interest when Bingham on January 25, 1866, sounded out sentiment for
an Amendment to limit the taxing power of the States and to prohibit
"class legislation"? Finally-and we arrive now at the heart of the mat-
ter--can there be shown to have been any significant relation between
58. It must be emphasized that three months elapsed between Bingham's first speech
in the House outlining in general terms the character of the Amendment, and adoption
of the final draft by the Joint Committee on April 28, 1866. CONG. GLO1E, 39th Cong. 1st
Sess. 429. Bingham's original positively-worded draft, "The Congress shall have power
to make all laws . . . necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property," reached the
floor of the House February 13, 1866. Even as early as December 15, 1865, the New
York World had called unfavorable attention to Bingham's original draft (at that time
pending merely as a resolution) "Congress shall have power . . .to secure to all per-
sons in every State . . . equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property."
See FLACK, THE ADoP'rIoN OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-MENT (1908) 140. It can be
said confidently therefore, that from December on, corporations and their counsel had
reason to be interested in the trend of events.
59. One of the arguments used by William Curtis Noyes in 1854 had been that the
New York Act was "entirely unequal in effect and operates only upon a certain class
of persons" [see 3 E. D. Smith 462], whereas to prohibit "class legislation" was of
course an avowed object of the framers of the Amendment. See particularly, Co,',.




the corporate activity which might be expected from the foregoing cir-
cumstances, and that which was implied to have taken place by Roscoe
Conkling's remarks in 1882?6o
Conkling, it will be recalled, at the climax of his 1882 argument before
the Supreme Court, declared "At the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified,61 as the records of the two houses will show, individuals and
joint stock companies were appealing for congressional and administrative
protection against invidious and discriminating state and local taxes. One
instance was that of an express company, whose stock was owned largely
by citizens of the State of New York who came with petitions and bills
seeking acts of Congress to aid them in resisting what they deemed
oppressive taxation in two States, and oppressive and ruinous rules of
damages applied under State laws."
0 2
Careful search of the Congressional Globe provides the material for a
partial answer to the above questions. It appears that while Bingham and
his colleagues were at work drafting the phraseology of Section One,
two different groups of corporations whose lawyers had earlier made
use of the component clauses, "came with petitions and bills" designed
to secure "congressional and administrative protection" against adverse
forms of State action.
First to arrive--and in such form, and under such circumstances as
could hardly have failed to attract interest on the part of the framers-
were petitions from insurance companies, mobilized now for an attempt,
to suppress and circumvent the type of legislation from which they had
long suffered, and which, notwithstanding the strongly ascendant national-
ism and the discredit of localistic policies as a result of Secession, had
recently made alarming headway on the Pacific Coast.0 Between March
60. See First Article, 47 YALE L. J. 371, 375-385.
61. Obviously, Conlding meant "At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted," not "ratified;" else his whole case would have fallen.
62. Conkling's Argument, First Article, 47 YALEn L. J. 371. [Italics added.]
63. As reconstructed chiefly from a pamphlet-circular To rn Isun.\:cn Acr,-:Ts
OF THE UNTED STATES (note 66, infra) published February 1, 1866, it appears that
while the Civil War brought a phenomenal prosperity to the industry as a whole, and
a vast increase in outstanding insurance, this prosperity was marred after 1864 by enact-
ment, first in California, then in Ne-vada and Oregon, of laws which had the effect not
only of "cinching" 'Wells Fargo Express Company but of sponsoring the growth on the
Pacific Coast of powerful insurance companies which-(or at least so the Eastern firms
feared)-might draw their capital from the bonanza mines of Nevada.
In 1862-63 San Francisco capitalists had begun to organize home companies, and in
1864 had succeeded in inducing the Legislature to boost the cash bond required of out-
side concerns from $50,000 to $75,000 in gold, and to require in addition to, not in lieu
of, as before, a premium tax of two per cent, etc. To catch Wells Fargo Express, a New
York corporation, foreign "insurance companies" were so defined as to include "all
express companies . . . engaged in the carriage of treasure or merchandise . . . and
insuring the same . . ." STATs. CAtr. (1863-1864) 131-134. As in all such matters,
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2, 1866-two days after the virtual defeat in the House of Bingham's
positively worded draft34-- and June 8, 1866-the date of final passage
of the Amendment by the Senate-more than two hundred of these peti-
tions were received in Congress "praying for enactment of just, equal
and uniform laws pertaining to interstate insurances, and for the creation
also of a Federal Bureau of Insurance"." This influx was given force
by a specially-prepared pamphlet"0 which pointed out the "Necessity",
California's statute promptly served as a model in Oregon, [ORE. GEN. LAWS (Deady
& Lane, 1843-1872) 447, 616] and in Nevada [NEv. STAT. (1864-1865) 104-9].
These developments on the Pacific Coast, together with passage of similar trouble-
some legislation in the Midwest, and the prospect that the Southern States would shortly
begin reenactment of non-intercourse laws, prompted the Eastern companies to meet in
the autumn of 1865 and organize for mutual protection. For almost a year, insurance
journals had been discussing the prospect of "nationalizing insurance" in the manner of
the banks; and in many respects conditions were favorable. At length, steering com-
mittees formed by both the life and the fire companies decided to work for a Federal
Bureau of Insurance. For supplementary sources see KNIGnT, HIsToRv OF LiFr INSqi-
ANCE IN THE UNITED STATES TO 1870 (1920) 134-141; COMMIERCIAL AND FINANCIAL
CHRONICLE (1866) 265, 292.
While no petitions are on record, the writer has wondered if perhaps Wells Fargo
was not the New York Company alluded to by Conkling in argument. Mr. Harold Jonas
of New York, who is completing a biography of Conkling, has suggested the counter
possibility that the reference may have been to the United States Express Company,
whose head was Thomas C. Platt, Conkling's political associate (and later) colleague
in the Senate. In either event, it seems probable that legislation of the type enacted in
California was the source of the express companies' troubles. This part of Conkling's
statement, therefore, may be concluded to have had some basis in fact.
64. Conservatives feared destruction of the States and Federal centralization; Radi-
cals the prospect of Democratic control of Congress and the almost certain repeal, in
that event, of all Reconstruction measures. For the Conservative viewpoint, see speech
of Rep. Hale of New York, CONG. GLODE on Feb. 27, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 1064-65.
Hotchkiss, in closing the debate, objected that Bingham's views were "not sufficiently
radical." He wanted the Amendment redrafted to secure conslitutional-not merely
congressional protection---"we may pass laws here today and the next Congress may
wipe them out-where is your guarantee then?" The writer suggests that this speech
by Hotchkiss probably impressed Bingham with the expediency of adopting the negative
form "No State shall . . ." In later years Bingham inferred that study of John Mar-
shall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore had prompted him to make the change [see
CONG. REC., March 28, 1871, Appendix pp. 83-85.] but it seems improbable in the light
of the foregoing that the influences were entirely academic.
By what the writer, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, concludes to have
been merely a coincidence, Rep. Hotchkiss on March 2nd-two days after making the
above-quoted speech-submitted the first insurance company petition found in the GLOar.
65. Of a total of 208 petitions, some bearing as many as 500 signatures, and prac-
tically all of which were submitted by Republicans in the House, nearly three-fourthq
are found to have been received prior to final action by the Joint Committee on Section
One-in fact, the peak was reached in mid-April just prior to such action. Only peti-
tions relating to the tariff and freedmen's rights appear to have been received in greater
numbers. The petitions dropped off suddenly in mid-June, but probably only because
the campaign organized in February had run its course.
66. CIRCULAR: TO THE INSURANCE, AGENTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 1, 1866)
[only known copy is in the Library of the Insurance Library Association of Boston]. Pre-
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the "Desirableness", and the "Equity" of congressional relief, and which
quoted in full (in addition to the stock commerce and Comity clause
arguments) Judge Skinner's brief arguing that an Illinois insurance law
was a violation of due process. Insurance company petitions are known
to have been received by at least six members of the Joint Committee,"r
and were referred in the House to the Committee on Commerce, whose
chairman at this session was Elihu Washburne, himself a member of the
Joint Committee.
In summary, one can say that these petitions were independently
motivated, and merely an extension and culmination of earlier trends.
It is also to be distinctly noted that a statute, 8 not a constitutional amend-
ment,"9 was the companies' real objective. It would seem to be established,
pared under the direction of C. C. Hine, secretary of companies' steering committee, and
one of the leading insurance publicists of the post-Civil War period, the pamphlet leaves
no doubt of the origin and character of the petitions. Elaborate instructions wvere pro-
vided for a "write-your-Congressman" campaign; petitions and memorials (on prepared
forms) were to be circulated among influential business men; conventions of agents were
proposed for each congressional district. Id. at 7-9.
The body of the pamphlet consisted chiefly of arguments and briefs against the con-
stitutionality of foreign corporation and non-intercourse laws; the most notable of which
were those of William Barnes, Superintendent of the Insurance Department of the State
of New York, (pp. 15-20); extracts from the argument of William Curtis Noyes taken
from 3 E. D. Smith (pp. 26) ; emphasis that under New York laws "the term perron
. . . shall be construed to include corporations as well as individuals" (p. 2 7 ) ; the entire
brief of Judge Mark Skinner of Chicago, holding the Illinois law of 1852 to be a viola-
tion of due process (pp. 27-30). Pages 33-52 were made up of selected articles from
insurance journals in 1864-1865 proposing a National Bureau of Insurance and a National
Insurance Law.
67. Conkling submitted five. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1662, 'March 26;
p. 1727, April 2; p. 1979, April 16; p.2049, April 19; p. 2442, May 7 (1866). WNrash-
burne, two; Morrill, one; Fessenden, one; Grimes, one; Harris, one. Bingham appears
to have submitted no petitions.
68. See CnicuLAR, op. cit. supra note 66, at 6. Just when the bill for a National Bu-
reau of Insurance was presented before Congress is unknown; but such a proposal was
reported by the House Judiciary Committee, June 29, 1866 [Coxo. GLn 3490]. And
previously, on June 14, the day following final passage of the Fourteenth Amendment by
Congress, Rep. Lawrence of Pennsylvania, had introduced a similar bill [Id. at 3162]
which received no attention on the floor of Congress. It appears that Rep. J. K. Moor-
head, brother of Jay Cooke's brother-in-law and partner, %was the co-sponsor (with Law-
rence) of the latter bill. Here again one is struck by a unique harmony of interests,
for a funding bill lay at the heart of the Cookes' entire enterprise at this date [Lmso:z,
JAY CooKE, PRIVATE BANKER (1936) 207-214, 239-240]; and one can readily understand
how a proposal to "nationalize" the insurance companies (after the manner of the national
banks) by investment of a certain share of capital in United States bonds, impressed the
Cookes as sound financial statesmanship.
69. For evidence that insurance men had nevertheless considered the prospects for
a constitutional amendment, see William Barnes, Superintendent of the Department of
Insurance of the State of New York, Annual Report for 1864, quoted in CwcuLmn, op.
cit. siupra note 66 at 19. Speaking of possible relief by interstate compacts, Barnes added
"Such a proceeding would . . . be undesirable and might be more troublesome . . .
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however, that the petitions came to the attention of the framers while
they were engaged in drafting the Amendment. On this basis, and in
the light' of Conkling's remarks, a tentative conclusion may be drawn.
It cannot be inferred that the Amendment was deliberately or consciously
framed to assist the insurance companies or other corporations, but every-
thing about the petitions-their source, incidence, chronology and sub-
stance-suggests that they would have been likely to raise the question
of corporate status while the framers were at work. 0
Arriving almost simultaneously with the petitions of the insurance com-
panies-yet addressed in this instance only to members of the Ohio and
Pennsylvania delegations-were several petitions from the "Cleveland
and Mahoning Railroad . . . asking Congress to restore" certain
franchises which "had been taken away by the . . . State of Penn-
sylvania, thus impairing vested rights of the citizens of Ohio". 7 These
petitions sought redress for repeal of charter privileges by the same State
which numbered among its constitutional opinions Brown v. Hummel
than a direct effort to produce an amendment of the Constitution, making the [comity
clause] expressly applicable to corporations as well as to citLwcns."
70. If Bingham is ever revealed to have had insurance company connections, one
might attach significance to the fact that he submitted his revised draft, made up (as
he emphasized) of the comity clause and the Fifth Amendment, on February 3rd, just
two days after the imprint date of the CIRCULAR: TO THE INSURANCE AGENTS OF TIlE
UNITEv STATES. It must be borne in mind, however, that an adequate explanation for
Bingham's adoption of this phraseology is found in his own earlier speeches; and in the
further fact that the Joint Committee had itself been moving in that direction. For the
obviously laborious evolution of the phraseology in sub-committees January 12 to 27,
1866, see KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMIxITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON IREcONsTmUCTlON
(1914) 46-58. In either case of course it is obvious that February 1 to 3 marks the
focal point of two independent but historically-converging lines of usage. The question
is: what sort of relations prevailed at the historical intersection?
71. The basic facts with reference to these petitions are that in the early Fifties, Ohio
promoters, led by David Tod, later war Governor of Ohio, had projected a railroad from
Cleveland to Pittsburgh, through the then largely undeveloped Youngstown district.
Franchises were obtained from both Ohio and Pennsylvania, and by the end of the
decade the road was complete to the Ohio line. For some reason, construction lagged
in Pennsylvania, and it was not until the early Sixties, when English capital became
interested, and plans were laid for a unified line through to Washington under direc-
tion of the Baltimore and Ohio, that the Cleveland and Mahoning and Pittsburgh and
Connellesville charters threatened to serve as means for breaking the monopoly of the
Pennsylvania Railroad in the region of Pittsburgh.
By Mfay, 1864, this threat was no longer merely apparent; and at the dictation of the
Pennsylvania's managers the state legislature summarily repealed the franchises of both
roads, charging failure to fulfill time clauses. Whereupon the victims resorted to the
Federal courts, secured a decision in July, 1865, holding the repealer void, and com-
menced negotiations with Tom Scott and J. Edgar Thomson of the monopoly-only to
be -harrassed in the state courts by a host of vexatious suits. At length, construction
stalled, the Ohio promoters resorted to flank attack in Congress, stressing with great
shrewdness their rival's contumacy of Federal authority. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2282, 2365-2366, 2902-2903, 2922-2925 (1866) ; HANET, CONGRaESSIONAL HISTORY
OF RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES 1850-1887 (1910) 222-223.
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and Erie Railroad v. Casey. Not unexpectedly, therefore, these petitions
are likewise found suffused with due process of law. They serve to
corroborate our tentative hypothesis regarding the character and effect
of the insurance company petitions, and the likely relations that existed
between the corporate and Negro rights usages of due process in 1866.
In this instance, however, it is to be emphasized that the evidence goes
considerably farther: by reason of certain of its ramifications, it not only
injects new life into the possibility that Bingham, in 1866, may have
prepared all his drafts with a definite intent to aid corporations as well
as natural persons; but it indicates that at least one of Bingham's col-
leagues, and perhaps three of the members of the Joint Committee who
voted in favor of his equal protection-due process phraseology, may have
done so with the understanding that its wording might prove useful to
corporations that found themselves in such straits as the Cleveland and
Mahoning Railroad.
Keystone of this hypothetical structure is the fact that Reverdy John-
son, the leading minority member on the Joint Committee, (who never-
theless voted fairly consistently in favor of Bingham's drafts72 ) had in
June, 1865, served as counsel for the Cleveland and Maiahoning Railroad
in its cases in the Federal courts.73 In that capacity Johnson appears to
have made such effective use of Chief Justice Lewis' dissenting opinion
in Erie Railroad v. Casey that Justice Grier, in voiding the repeal of the
Cleveland and Mahoning franchises, did so on the ground that the com-
pany and its affiliates had been denied the due course of law guaranteed
by the Pennsylvania Constitution.74 It therefore seems likely that Reverdy
72. Johnson even voted in favor of adding the just compensation clause [KnD.ICv. ,
op. cit. supra note 70, at 85], although he opposed the privileges or immunities clause and
moved to strike it out in Senate debate (see infra note 76).
73. Baltimore v. Pittsburgh and Connellesville Railroad, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 827, 570
(C. C. W. D. Pa. 1865). For Johnson's connection with the case see Coxc. GLonE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2925; STEiNER, THE Lirz OF REvmR D JorNsox (1914) 141. Technically
Johnson was counsel for the city of Baltimore, a bondholder; but the case vas moout.
Actually the Baltimore and Ohio monopoly, for which Johnson had been counsel for
forty years, stood behind both the Cleveland and Mahoning and the Pittsburgh and
Connellesville roads.
74. Id. at 13. Declaring the object and effect of the repealer to be to "transfer the
franchises and property of one corporation, anxious . . . to complete a valuable public
improvement, to another [the Pennsylvania monopoly] whose interest is not to complete
the road," the Justice held the act to be first a violation of the contract clause, then of
due course of law. Due process, he implied, required tlmt the Attorney General should
have instituted judicial proceedings to ascertain the facts, etc. This was precisely the
point on which the Pennsylvania State Court had ruled to the contrary in Erie R. R. v.
Casey, cited note 45, supra.
Justice Grier made no mention of due course of law in his opinion, but said merely
"The principles of law . . . are . . . clearly and tersely stated by Chief Justice Lewis
in his opinion to be found in 1 Grant's Cases 274 with a review of the cases and a proper
appreciation of that from Ioa"--the latter of course dealing with the "law of the land.
'
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Johnson, at least, must have understood that to add a due process clause
to the Federal Constitution as an express restraint upon the States was
to add a source of valuable protection to corporate interests. Indeed, if
one assumes that Johnson recalled the gingerly manner in which Justice
Grier had been obliged to apply the "due course of law" clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution,76 some special significance might be attached
to the inference of Johnson's cryptic remark, made in Senate debate,
that he favored the due process clause because he knew what its effect
would be.16
Reverdy Johnson was not the only member of the Joint Committee who
had close relations with the Cleveland and Mahoning Railroad. On May
30, 1866, a month after final adoption of the present form of Section
One, Thaddeus Stevens, whose narrow Negro Race draft had finally
been abandoned (with his own approving vote) in favor of Bingham's
broader drafts, 7  undertook to jam through the House, without debate,
bills for relief of the Cleveland and Mahoning and affiliated companies."8
Failing in his immediate objective, Stevens nevertheless succeeded the
following day in securing full approval of the bills by the House, after
a debate in which Justice Grier's opinion had been read into the record.
And voting in favor of passage on May 31, 1866-while the Fourteenth
Amendment was still being debated in the Senate-were, in addition to
Stevens himself, Roscoe Conkling and John A. Bingham.
75. See note 8, supra.
76. "I am in favor of that part of the section which denies to a State the right to
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, but I think
it is quite objectionable to provide that 'no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' simply be-
cause I don't understand what will be the effect of that." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3041, June 8, 1866.
77. Stevens' course in these matters excites speculation. After announcing [see
KENDRICK, op. cit. supra note 70, at 83], that he sponsored an amendment whose first
Section provided "No discrimination shall be made by any State, nor by the United
States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color or previous condition of
servitude" he thereupon proceeded to vote (1) in favor of Bingham's move to add the
just compensation clause [id. at 85]; (2) in favor of adding what is now Section One
as [a redundant?] Section Five [id. at 87] (3) against striking out the same Section
[id. at 99]; (4) in favor of substituting Bingham's draft (stricken out as Section Five)
in place of his own [id. at 106]. Stevens was thus the sponsor of the narrowest sort of
Negro Race draft and at the same time the most consistent supporter of Bingham's
["economic?"] drafts; and ultimately, when forced to choose between Bingham's and his
own, he chose Bingham's. Why? Was it to afford double or triple protection to free
Negroes and mulattoes? Or was it to protect corporations? Or was it, perhaps, to do
both?
78. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 2902-2903. Strictly speaking,
Stevens sponsored the Pittsburgh and Connellesville bill, while Garfield sponsored the
Cleveland and Mahoning's. The latter had been introduced in the House April 30, a
fortnight after the first petitions, and just two days after final and unexpected substi-
tution of Bingham's for Stevens' draft of Section One.
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III.
Many matters, of course, remain to be investigated.70 Yet with even
these shadowy glimpses into the relations existing between the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the corporate interests farther along
in the use of the due process and Comity clauses, one is no longer at loss
to suggest plausible explanations for the statements Conkling made in
his argument in 1882, nor is it very rash to venture hypotheses regarding
the motives of Bingham and his associates. It is perhaps too much to
expect that any of these hypotheses can ever be proved, but each possesses
the dubious merit of being consistent with the known fragments of evi-
dence. Disregarding such problems as the burden of proof, and inter-
preting matters most favorably to the idea of corporate inclusion, four
major possibilities may be noted, any one of which lends support to the
view that the constitutional status of corporations probably was con-
sidered by the framers.
1. Wholly apart from Bingham's personal understanding of his
phraseology, his original intentions in drafting it, or the relations exist-
ing between the Cleveland and lMahoning Railroad and other members
of the Joint Committee, it is possible that Reverdy Johnson, in the course
of the Committee's deliberations, or perhaps even in private conversation
with Conkling, 0 mentioned Justice Grier's decision as among the most
79. Id. at 2922-2925. The vote in the House on the Cleveland and 'Mahoning bill
was 77 to 41, with 65 not voting. Prior to the vote, Garfield, who was in charge of de-
bate, made plain that the Pennsylvania legislature had acted "without a hearing, with-
out any legal process in the courts . . .by the mere force of votes . . ." Whereupon
a waspish Pennsylvania sympathizer correctly anticipated a reciprocal treatment by Con-
gress !
Despite this strong reception in the House, however, the Garfield-Stevens bills vre
killed by the Senate Committee on Commerce. And here, too, hangs a circumstance.
Senator Edmunds of Vermont reported the adverse action of the Senate Committee; and
made clear that he in no way concurred in the result. Id. at 3333; see also 4,18. This
of itself would excite no interest, except that sixteen years later, in the Son Marco Case,
[116 U. S. 138 (1882)] Senator Edmunds appeared as counsel for the Southern Pacific
Railroad. While he made no argument as explicit as Conkling's, he nevertheless did
appear as one who had served in Congress in 1866 and who w.-as presumed to speak with
authority when he declared: "There is not one word in it [the Fourteenth Amendment]
that did not undergo the completest scrutiny." In his peroration he extolled the "broad
and catholic provision for universal security resting upon citizenship as it regarded po-
litical rights and resting upon humanity as it regarded private rights." See p. 8 of
"Argument of Mr. George F. Edinmzds" before the Supreme Court of the United States
in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. R., 116 U. S. 138 (1882).
80. Conkling's voting record on Section One is scarcely less remarkable than Stev-
ens'. Not only did he vote repeatedly in the Committee against Bingham's drafts down
to April 28th [KENDRICK, op. cit. supra note 70, at 61, 62, 93, 99], and not only did he
vote for the motion tabling the draft in the House Feb. 28th, (Cozo. GLoBS, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1094] but on January 22, he had even gone on record in debate as op-
posing an amendment which would "prohibit States from denying civil or political rights
to any class of persons." [Italics added]. Such a plan, he declared, "encounters a great
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recent involving the due process clause, and in this manner precipitated
a frank discussion of the entire problem of corporate rights. Such a
discussion would in likelihood have turned on the social ends which
Grier's opinion had served; and we can be reasonably certain that in this
respect the leading members of both parties on the Committee were in
substantial agreement as to the merits: monopoly had been frustrated,
bondholders protected, "vested rights" rendered secure, and the way re-
opened for the economic development of important sections of the coun-
try."' When it is realized that framers considering the subject in this
light would have been unlikely to have pursued matters further, or to
have pondered the abstract problem of discretionary due process as a
means for frustrating social reforms and legislation, an entirely new face
is put upon the problem of "conspiracy"."2 Not only is it plain that the
objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the principle of existing local sovereignty.
It denies to the people of the several States the right to regulate their own affairs in their
own way." Id. at 358. Yet on April 28 Conkling voted in favor of substituting Bing-
ham's for Stevens' draft. KENDRiCK, op. cit. supra, at 106. How is one to explain his
reversal? Merely as another product of the early confusion and uncertainty over Recon-
struction policy which historians have noted in the minds of many leading Radicals-
uncertainty which disappeared when partisan advantage became clearer? Id. at cc. 4, 5, 6;
BEALE, TiE CRITICAL YEAR (1930) passim. Or is one to regard it as having some more
concrete and specific base? Future research should make this clear.
81. It is interesting to note that Congress at this session finally passed the amended
Interstate Communications bill which Garfield and other Republicans had been sponsor-
ing since 1864 in an attempt to break the power of such State monopolies as the Camden
and Amboy of New Jersey. In its original form the bill would have declared competing
lines military and post roads and have given Federal authority to build in disregard of
State charters. See HANFEY, op. cit. supra note 71, at 157-224, passim. See also Congres-
sional debate on the measure, May 5, 1866 [CoNG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866)
2365-66] wherein Senator Sherman cites Ohio's "demand" for the Mahoning and Con-
nellesville roads as justifying passage; and wherein Reverdy Johnson implies that "the
controversy [between these roads and the Pennsylvania monopoly] is not yet settled,"
In 1866, opposition to such measures as the Interstate Communications Act came
chiefly from Democrats and conservatives fearful for "States' Rights" and alarmed at
the trend toward "centralization." Id. at 1857; 2197-2199. Reverdy Johnson himself
had scruples in this regard, explained in part perhaps by the fact that the Baltimore and
Ohio monopoly, while endeavoring to gain a route through Pennsylvania, was resisting
attempts of rival roads to break into Maryland.
Rep. Jack Rogers, the second most influential minority member of the Joint Commit-
tee-who also voted consistently in favor of Bingham's drafts, including the rejected just
compensation clause-was during these years counsel and Congressional advocate for
the Camden and Amboy monopoly in New Jersey. In the latter capacity in 1864 Rogers
had even argued that an early draft of the Interstate Communications bill threatened
to deprive the Camden and Amboy of its property without just compensation I CON(.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) 1238-1241.
82. Inevitably, in a priori analysis, students of constitutional history have tended to
assume that the Conkling-Beard thesis requires (1) that intent to include corporations
was the primary or decisive fact operating in the selection of the phraseology, (2) that
it was accordingly necessary for the framers to have forcsece the substantive potentiali-
ties inherent in the clause. It is now plain of course that neither point is essential to the
1938] "CONSPIRACY THEORY"
status of corporations under the Amendment could have been raised in-
cidentally, and in good faith, without regard for anti-democratic or
reactionary purposes ;3 but it would seeni to be necessary, if one is to
escape an anachronistic fallacy, to make due allowance for the character
of this early usage by Justice Grier and the manner in which it would
have determined the attitude toward corporate personality if the question
were raised.
2. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Bingham, an Olioan, and
the Congressional representative of a section of the State interested in
the completion of the Cleveland and Maiahoning Railroad,"' knew of the
company's difficulties from the first, and watched with mounting appre-
hension the tactics employed by its Pennsylvania rival. Thus it is possible
to argue that even if Bingham originally knew nothing of Reverdy
Johnson's arguments (or Justice Grier's opinion) predicated upon due
process, his personal sense of justice was offended by the charter repeal,- 5
and accordingly he later drafted his constitutional amendment with the
definite intention of covering such cases-an intention of which Conkling
somehow became aware. It is to be emphasized that additional evidence
is required to establish the proposition in this form; yet one feels war-
ranted in pointing out that circumstances, so far as they are known, are
not inconsistent with this interpretation of Conkling's inference.
proposition; and that the second is itself the product of serious misconceptions concern-
ing use of due process prior to the Civil War.
It should be said, therefore, in tribute to the Beards, that whatever the shortcomings
of the circumstantial evidence upon which they appear to have based their conclusions,
their fundamental asstmptions were far sounder than those of constitutional historians
who often have criticized them.
83. Even if it develops that Bingham was aware of the Cleveland and Mahoning's
troubles, or that he had knowledge of effective corporate use of due process at the lime he
phrased his original drafts, it by no means follows that intent to aid corporations was
primary-least of all that Section One was a mere plot to aid certain Ohio promoters.
No one reading the speeches of the idealist who in 1859 sought to safeguard the rights
of free Negroes to travel and to make and enforce contracts, and to earn a decent living
in the North as well as in the South, will be likely to argue that Bingham's primary-
or even his incidental-purpose wmas ever to protect hotel corporations and factory owners
from paying workers a minimum wage. Our thinking on these subjects has been too
much confused by the unfortunate connotations of the word "conspiracy."
84. Defeated in 1862, but reelected in 1864, Bingham represented the cast-central
constituency adjoining that passed through by the Cleveland and Mahoning. The road
then terminated at Youngstown, leaving parts of this rich coal district without direct
connections with Pittsburgh.
85. In view of Bingham's apparent readiness to apply the due process clause where-
ever needed to protect or advance interests he approved of, this possibility is obviously
of more than academic importance. Since we know (from his vote) his reaction to the
major issue, it is largely a question of whether sufficient publicity was given to the con-
troversy in its early stages in 1864-65 to assure that Bingham, a lawyer and politician
whose business was to keep informed regarding such matters, would have been likely to
have learned of it.
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3. Another possibility is that while Bingham may have known nothing
of the railroads' use of due process when he first submitted his drafts,
and while he originally had no thought of aiding any one but Negroes
and natural persons, and while the corporation on its part originally
intended to do no more than appeal for Congressional aid at a time
when circumstances were peculiarly favorable to such aid, the presenta-
tion of the petitions and bills, and the lobby arguments incident thereto,
nevertheless did make clear that the due process-equal protection phrase-
ology was comprehensive enough to include corporations. It is quite
possible therefore that a full and free discussion ensued in the Committee,
or among some of its members, regarding the expediency of a draft which
offered prospective benefits of this type.
4. The final possibility is that petitions and bills of the insurance or
express companies-or perhaps the remarks of an importunate counsel
or lobbyist in charge of the companies' campaign in Congress-served
to direct attention not merely to the potentialities of the due process-equal
protection phraseology, but also to the privileges or immunities clause.
It therefore involves no strain on credulity to believe that corporate citi-
zenship as well as corporate personality was considered by the Joint
Committee; yet one wonders-if this happened to be the case-whether
the framers may not have concluded, in view of repeated interpretations
of the Comity clause, that there was no likelihood corporations would ever
be treated as "citizens" within the meaning of Section One. 0
86. It is an ironic fact, suggestive in certain of its implications, that the insurance
companies, which down to 1866 pioneered in the use of the phraseology employed in Scc-
tion One, were almost the last to gain protection under its terms. This paradox is the
more striking because these companies were naturally the first to employ the improved
weapons. As early as February, 1871, the Continental Life Insurance Company of New
York attacked a New Orleans agency-license ordinance which discriminated against out-
side corporations, counsel apparently contending that corporations were "persons" within
the meaning of both Section One and the Civil Rights Act passed in enforcement there-
of. United States Circuit Judge Woods flatly rejected this view, reasoning much as did
Mr. Justice Black in his recent dissent in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v.
Johnson, 58 Sup. Ct. 436 (U. S. 1938), i.e., that since only natural persons can be "born and
naturalized," a double standard of interpretation of the word "person" is required to sus-
tain the argument from the present text. Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 1 WIoodg 85
(U. S. C. C. La. 1870). (Inquiry of the clerk of the United States District Court for New
Orleans reveals that the official record of this important case has been lo.t).
The Continental Life Insurance Company began its attack on this New Orleans ordi-
nance just two weeks after the United States Supreme Court, in Liverpool Insurance
Company v. Oliver, 77 U. S. 566 (February 6, 1871) gave counsel to understand, as
clearly as a court ever could, that nothing was to be gained by continued reliance on
the comity clause to attack legislation of this type. Beginning with Paul v. Virginia,
75 U. S. 168 (argued in October, 1869), and continuing with Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U. S.
410 (submitted December 21, 1870), former Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, as chief coun-
sel for the companies, had relied almost entirely on the commerce and comity clauses in
making the long delayed appeals to the Supreme Court. This fact of itself suggests
what might be assumed from Curtis' past connections with l urray v. Hoboken, 18 How.
"CONSPIRACY THEORY"
All these possibilities, of course, leave a doubter with his doubts. The
striking thing in this article, as in the previous one, is the paradoxical and
indecisive character of the evidence. Just as discovery of the Negro rights
sense in which Bingham first used due process tended to eclipse what
had been regarded as his economic motivation, so now a survey of the
pre-war use of due process by corporations suggests that the framers
may have proceeded with greater understanding than constitutional his-
torians have been willing to acknowledge. The impressive thing, indeed,
is the cantilever nicety of the balance.
It is now plain not only that a development of corporate personality
took place prior to 1866 but that Reverdy Johnson, at least, and perhaps
several of his colleagues, had knowledge of certain phases of that develop-
ment. Yet when this is said it must be remembered (1) that Bingham's
speeches and drafts in 1866 were modelled on earlier speeches which
were preoccupied with the problem of protecting natural persons; (2)
that Conkling's misquotations from the journal are difficult to reconcile
with a clean-cut case, particularly in view of the absence of corroborating
statements by other members of the Joint Committee, and since Conk-
ling himself appears to have said nothing publicly for sixteen years.
Heightening the uncertainty and confusion inherent in the foregoing
circumstances is the further fact that Reverdy Johnson, the one member
of the Joint Committee who had used corporate personality prior to
1866, nevertheless failed to invoke the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment when he argued for the plaintiffs in the hard-fought case of
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, in 1869.8'
Obviously the foregoing evidence can be woven into different patterns.
Ignoring or minimizing the first set of factors, Conkling can be portrayed
as a shrewd lawyer who in his argument in 1882 capitalized earlier coin-
cidence. Ignoring or minimizing the second set, he can be portrayed as
a drafter who in 1866 figured in something akin to a "plot".
After considering the matter for two years, the writer's personal con-
clusion is that as long as all major conditions are fulfilled, Conkling
perhaps ought to be given benefit of the doubt, even though few courts
would be inclined to accept him as a disinterested or even honorable wit-
ness. Yet this acknowledges no more than that the corporation problem
probably did come up incidentally in the discussions, and that no special
272 (U.S. 1855), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, (Snpra note 56)-namely, that Curtis'
preferred strategy, was to get corporations declared "citizens" rather than "persons"; and
to do so, first under the comity clause, then under Section One. Apparent failure to stress
the due process, equal protection, and privileges or immunities clauses in these early test
cases may therefore have been simply a tactical maneuver.
87. 8 Vall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869). See the summary of Johnson's argument in
the Lawyers' Edition, at page 483.
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significance was at that time attached to it one way or the other. From
a study of the evolution of the phraseology in the Joint Committee the
writer feels confident that Section One was not designed to aid corpora-
tions, nor was the distinction between "citizens" and "persons" conceived
for their benefit.
But the outstanding conclusion warranted by the present evidence is
concerned with the irrelevancy rather than with the character of the Joint
Committee's intentions. It is now plain that corporate personality, as a
constitutional doctrine, antedated the Fourteenth Amendment, and was
in fact so vital and natural a part of the self-expansion of judicial power
within the framework of due process, that its postwar development was
assured, whatever may have been the original objectives of the framers.
The two great classes of petitions s8 in the Congressional Globe fore-
shadow and explain this result: Having simultaneously fostered the
growth of corporate enterprise as well as a mighty upsurge of popular
idealism, the Civil War of itself consummated a marriage of idealistic
and economic elements in American constitutional theory."0 In the words
of Max Ascoli,9" the Fourteenth Amendment was the "supreme cele-
bration" of this union. It would appear largely immaterial whether those
who presided at the rites were conscious of their function.
88. These petitions present an insight into the unique harmony of ideas and inter-
ests between petitioners seeking added protection for property rights and those seeking
to secure Freedmen's rights. Side by side, and often submitted on the same day by the
same members of Congress, are appeals from "Western citizens . . . for the greater
protection of interstate securities," from "Iowa Quakers asking perfect equality before
the law for all regardless of color," from "citizens . . . of Pennsylvania asking for
amendments giving all classes of citizens their natural rights," from "citizens of Penn-
sylvania asking just and equal laws relating to interstate insurances to protect the inter-
ests of the policies."
89. Between Radicals and racial equalitarians on the one hand, and representatives
of business enterprise on the other, existed not only harmony in such general objectives as
the need for expanding Federal and contracting State power, but in the very details of
constitutional theory-as evidenced by the natural rights usage by both groups of both
the comity and the due process clauses. Such harmonies, essentially products of the
Secession and defeat of the slave interest, and of the determination of both humanitarians
and northern capitalists to let nothing jeopardize the fruits of the war, stand sharply in
contrast to the weakness and isolation of these same groups in the Thirties and Forties.
See note 18, supra.
90. INTELLIGENCE IN POLITICS (1936) 160-161.
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